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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest  in  the  theory  of  economic  growth  and  the  theory  of  the  operation  of 
financial  markets has  increased  significantly  in  recent  years.  This has  led  to  a 
greater appreciation of the role of knowledge accumulation  in the growth process 
and deeper understanding of the incentive problems that plague financial markets. 
The advances  in  these  two  important  areas  of  economic  theory  have,  however, 
occurred  essentially  independently  of  one other'.  Typically,  in  the  new  growth 
models,  financial  markets  are  implicitly  assumed  to  operate  smoothly  in  the 
background.  There is  little  consideration  given  to  the implications  for  resource 
allocation  of  imperfect  information,  asymmetric  pay-offs  and  financial  market 
legislation.  This is an important omission as resource accumulation does not occur 
independently of the financial system.  The activities that lead to the accumulation 
of technology and knowledge involve risk and often require external finance.  The 
availability  of  that  finance  and  the  conditions  under  whlch  it  is  obtained  help 
determine  the  nature  of  resource  accumulation.  In  general,  the  incentives  that 
financial intermediaries face do not guarantee the socially optimal accumulation of 
the key resources that propel sustained growth.  These incentives are distorted both 
by regulation and by the very nature of loan contracts.  This paper explores some of 
the  relationships  between  the  nature  of  a  country's  financial  markets  and  the 
allocation  of  its  fmancial  resources  and  thus  ultimately  the  country's  rate  of 
economic growth.  As a case study, the paper also examines some of the effects that 
the financial deregulation which took place in Australia in the 1980s has had on the 
allocation of resources within Australia. 
Recent  research  has  made  some  attempt  to connect  these  two  areas.  Endogenous growth 
models with some type of financial sector (either financial intermediaries or a stock market) have 
been developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1 989), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga 
and  Smith (1991)  and  Levine  (199i).  These models  focus on  the  "liquidity insurance"  that  a 
financial sector provides.  In contrast, work by  King and  Levine (1992) focuses on the role that 
intermediaries play in  project selection. It  has  long  been  recopsed  that  the  financial  system  influences  economic 
development through two key mechanisms.  The first is  the ability of the financial 
system to transfer resources fiom those who wish  to  delay consumption today  to 
those  who  wish  to  bring  hture  consumption  or  investment  forward  to  today. 
Without this transfer, all investment would have to be self-financed.  This would 
necessarily  constrain  investment  as  many  investment  projects  are  beyond  the 
resources of individuals.  As  a result, the capital stock would  be lower, as would 
per-capita  incomes.  Second, and  even more fundamentally, the  financial system 
provides  the  economy  with  a  medium  of  exchange that  is  universally  accepted. 
Without it, the degree of specialisation would be constrained and barter would be 
the predominant form of trade. 
These two  basic  hnctions of the  financial system  are  well  understood.  For  an 
economy to  achieve sustained  growth  there must  be  confidence  in  the  payments 
system and the financial system must be able to transfer resources from savers to 
investors.  As McKinnon (1986) argues, for the system to be able to perform these 
tasks effectively, the inflation rate should be low and there should be confidence in 
the banking system.  This requires a central bank that is essentially independent and 
cannot be forced into inflationary finance of government budget deficits.  It  is key 
that the government maintain strict control of the country's fiscal position.  Failure to 
maintain this control can undermine the willingness of individuals to hold currency, 
increase  uncertainty  in  the  economy  and  lead  to  siglificait  misallocation  of 
resources.  It  is  also important for the currency to be convertible.  Convertibility 
increases  confidence  in  the  payments  system,  facilitates  international  trade  and 
prevents the costs associated with black markets and substitute currencies. 
Taking these  conditions  as gven, this  paper  examines  some of  tlie  factors  that 
determine the efficiency with which the financial system transfers hnds from savers 
to  investors.  The rate  at  which  an  economy grows  is  a positive fullction  of the 
efficiency of this process.  While a number of nations have been  able to  achieve 
considerable expansion  of the  capital  stock through  domestic  savings, not  all  of 
these nations have experienced  the expected high  economic growth,  Part  of the 
problem  is  in  the  allocation  of  savings.  Financial  resources  have been  used  by 
governments for political purposes, to promote income redistribution and for social 
goals.  Equally importantly, the allocation of resources by financial markets has not 
always  been  socially  optimal  because  of  frnancial  market  regulation,  problems induced  by  asymmetric  information  between  borrowers  and  lenders,  and  the 
inability of financial intermediaries to screen and monitor loans effectively. 
Both Stiglitz (1989) and King and Levine (1992) argue that one of the key roles of 
financial intermediaries is the choosing between competing sectors of the economy, 
between  competing  firms  and  between  competing  investment  projects.  If 
intermediaries operate under restrictive regulations then this "choice" is affected by 
how  the  regulations  impact  on  the  incentives  of  the  intermediary.  Even  in 
deregulated financial  markets,  intermediaries retain  a role  in  "choosing" between 
conflicting demands because the  allocation of savings on the basis of price  is not 
always possible.  The  work  of  Stiglitz and  Weiss  (1981)  highlights  one  of the 
problems.  With  a  loan  contract  the  borrower  does  not  repay  the  loan  if  the 
investment is a failure, but gets to retain the profits (less the agreed payments to the 
bank) if the project is a success.  This asymmetry means that the borrower will be 
willing to  borrow  at  interest  rates  that  make  the  project  have  negative  expected 
social value.  If the bank is unable to screen its customers then it may well lend to 
customers  who  are  undertaking  such  inefficient  projects.  In  the  context  of 
endogenous growth  models,  inefficiencies  in  financial  markets  slow  the  rate  at 
which  society  accumulates knowledge  and  thus  also slow the  economy's  rate  of 
growth. 
The  following  sections  of  the  paper  explore  various  aspects  of  the  impact  that 
financial intermediaries have on  economic growth  tlu-ough their  role of allocating 
savings.  Section  2  begins  by  presenting  Romer's  (1989)  model  of  endogenous 
growth.  In this model the accumulation  of knowledge  leads to economic growth. 
While consumer preferences, the current state of technology and the stock of slulled 
labour all influence the rate at which knowledge accumulates, no role is given to the 
financial sector.  However, in  reality  there are likely  to be  important interactions 
between the financial  system and the nature  and  extent of resource  accumulation. 
These interactions are explored in Section 3. 
Ideally,  it  would  be  usehl to  undertake  some formal  testing  of  the  models  that 
predict a link between financial structure and economic growth.  This, however, is a 
difficult task.  The models make predictions concerning steady-state growth rates. 
They typically  say nothing  about the  transition  phase  to  a new  steady state; this 
transition phase could, however, take many years.  It  is difficult to test the models 
using  data for  a  single  country  because  datasets with  the  required  variables  are generally of insufficient length.  More support for these  models has been  found 
using cross-country studies.  King and Levine (1992) report results that suggest that 
the scale and efficiency of financial intermediation are robustly  and  significantly 
correlated with economic growth in a cross-section of countries.  Again, however, 
this  work is  not  without  its  problems.  Foremost  amongst  these,  is the  general 
sensitivity of the  results  of  studies of growth  rates  to  the  inclusion~exclusion  of 
particular variables.  More convincing formal econometric support for the various 
theories appears to require either longer datasets or an improvement in econometric 
techniques.  Thus,  rather  than  embark along  the  road  of  formal  empirical tests, 
Section  4  examines  some  of  the  implications  of  the  liberalisation  of  financial 
markets that occurred in Australia in the 1980s. 
Australia  makes  an  interesting  case  study  of  the  consequences  of  financial 
deregulation.  Until  the  1980s,  the  Australian  banking  sector  was  subject  to 
considerable regulation.  Controls were placed on both lending and deposit rates and 
on the growth of bank balance sheets.  These controls were primarily used  as a 
macro-economic management tool.  However, as the financial system developed, 
the  regulations became increasingly ineffective.  The  adverse resource  allocation 
effects of the regulations also came to be more appreciated.  As a consequence, the 
regulations were removed in the first half of the 1980s.  Section 4 reviews some of 
the implications of this liberalisation.  Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
2.  GROWTH THROUGH KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION 
The traditional neoclassical view of economic growth is associated with the work of 
Solow (1956 and 1957). He argued that differences in capital-labour ratios were the 
key determinant of cross-country differences in the level of per-capita incomes.  In 
Solow's model, the rate at which per-capita income increased in the steady state was 
explained by exogenous technological progress.  This exogeneity assumption meant 
that there was no consideration of how or why technological progress took place. 
The new generation of growth models explicitly address these issues by modelling 
the  technology  and  knowledge  accumulation processes.  In  so doing,  they  add 
considerably to our understanding of the economic growth process. 
In  these  models,  knowledge is  defined  in  various  ways.  In  the  Romer  (1989) 
model, knowledge is equated with the number of blue-prints for intermediate goods that have been developed.  In the model presented by Lucas (1988), knowledge is 
defined as the stock of human capital.  In other models it is defined as production 
knowledge gained from learning-by-doing and in others as the level of technological 
sophistication.  In  the discussion that  follows, the term  knowledge is used  in  a 
generic sense to include each of these forms of knowledge. 
Romer assumes that the economy has three sectors: a sector producing final goods,' 
a sector producing differentiated interrnediate goods and a research sector producing 
"blueprints".  The final good is produced using unskilled labour (L), skilled labour 
(HI) and  all possible varieties of interrnediate goods that  are currently available. 
The production function for final goods, which exhibits constant returns to scale, is 
given by: 
where  x(i)  is  the  input  of  variety  i  of  the  intermediate  good.  An  important 
characteristic of this production function is that output increases when the number of 
varieties  of  interrnediate goods increases,  even  if  the  total  input  of interrnediate 
goods is held constant; that is, there are returns to variety in intermediate goods. 
The interrnediate goods are produced with constant marginal cost with capital being 
the only input.  The capital stock increases through time as consumption is foregone. 
Before an interrnediate good can be produced, it must be developed by the research 
sector.  Once developed, the firm  that wishes to produce the intermediate good buys 
the design from the research sector.  The increase in  the number  of new  designs 
(which is equated with an increase in knowledge) depends upon three factors: the 
stock of existing knowledge (A), the amount of skilled labour used in  the research 
sector (H2)  and the productivity of that labour in creating new varieties (6).  The 
increase in the number of new varieties is given by: 
This production function exhibits increasing returns to scale.  However, producers 
of the blueprints are required to pay only for the skilled labour; they are able to use 
the  existing stock  of  knowledge  (A) for  free.  This  allows  the  existence of  a 
competitive research sector. Increases in the stock of knowledge have two important effects on the  economy. 
First, the increasing stock of knowledge makes it easier to produce new knowledge 
(that  is,  new  varieties)  and  second,  it  increases  the  number  of  varieties  of 
intermediate goods available to final good producers.  This in turn increases output. 
Consumers are assumed to have a standard intertemporal constant elasticity utility 
function given by: 
C'-" -  1  1  U(c)e-@dt  where U(c)  = 
1-0 
9  -[O,4 
0 
Each consumer  is  assumed  to  be  endowed with fixed quantities of  unskilled  and 
skilled labour.  In each of the  industries profits are zero.  Finally, equilibrium is 
assumed to exist in the market for skilled labour; that is HI+H2  = H, where H is the 
stock of skilled labour in the economy. 
Romer shows that the equilibrium growth rate in thls economy (g) is given by: 
SH -  Ap  a 
g=  Ao+l 
where  A = 
(1 -  a-n(a+n  (4) 
The  growth  rate  is  increasing  in  the  stock  of  human  capital  (H)  and  in  the 
productivity of human capital in creating new knowledge (6). The more efficient is 
the society in using its existing knowledge to create new knowledge, and the more 
resources it has to devote to knowledge creation, the faster will be its growth rate. 
The growth rate is negatively related to the rate at which individuals discount the 
future (p).  A higher discount rate leads to reduced capital accumulation and thus a 
reduction in the production of intermediate goods.  The growth rate is increasing in 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (I/a); that is, as consumers become more 
willing  to  substitute  consumption  between  periods,  the  growth  rate  increases  as 
consumers  are  prepared  to  forgo  consumption  today  for  higher  consumption 
tomorrow. 
Romer's model has many interesting implications for economic growth and the role 
of  govemment  in  encouraging  growth.  Unlike  the  Solow  growth  model,  the 
preference parameters (p and a)  affect the steady-state growth rate.  More patient 
societies will grow faster.  Romer also shows that since researchers are not able to 
capture  the  full  returns  to  society  of  their  innovations,  the  growth  rate  of  the economy will be less than socially optimal.  Government subsidisation of research 
and development thus may be desirable.  Further, the model suggests that policies 
aimed at  increasing the efficiency with which the economy translates  its existing 
resources into faster knowledge accumulation are likely to  speed the steady-state 
growth rate. 
The work of Romer  and others has been important in re-emphasising the role of 
knowledge accumulation in the growth process.  It emphasises that the decision to 
create knowledge is one made in response to market forces.  It also emphasises that 
there are important positive externalities for society from the creation of knowledge, 
and  thus  left  solely  to  the  market,  there  may  be  insufficient  accumulation  of 
knowledge.  The Romer model, in ignoring financial markets, is typical of models in 
this framework.  Savings, in the form of foregone consumption, are assumed to be 
costlessly and efficiently transformed into capital to be used in the production  of 
intermediate goods.  Financial markets are implicitly assumed to be working in  the 
background  allowing  individuals to  substitute consumption between  periods.  In 
addition,  knowledge  creation  happens  the moment  the  resources  are devoted  to 
research and there is no risk involved in the innovation process.  Since knowledge 
creation  occurs instantaneously  it  does not have to  be financed  through  financial 
markets. 
Clearly, the attention given by governments to the operation of the fmancial system 
suggests that  financial markets  should  not  be  pushed  into  the  background  when 
considering economic growth.  Given that research and development and knowledge 
accumulation are risky activities and that the "inventor" may have a considerable 
information  advantage  over  the  lender,  questions  concerning  the  incentives  of 
financial intermediaries become irnportant.  In terms of the  above model, a more 
efficient financial system, through say its ability to improve the screening of lending 
projects,  may  increase the productivity of existing knowledge  and human  capital. 
This can be represented by an increase in the parameter 6.  As equation (4) shows, 
increases in 6 lead to faster ecoi~ornic  growtll. 
More generally, the financial system, through its roles of screening proposed lending 
projects, facilitating intertemporal substitution in  consumption and investment and 
influencing the degree of uncertainty in  the economy, has an important influence on 
the  rate  of  economic  growth.  These issues are considered  in more  detail  in  the 
following section. 3.  THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN KNOWLEDGE 
ACCUMULATION AND GROWTH 
The depth of a country's financial markets depends on a variety of factors.  These 
include the nature and extent of controls  on financial intermediation, the nation's 
legal and accounting rules and the level of per-capita income.  As many economists 
have noted,  there is a positive relationship between the level of per-capita  income 
and the extent of financial intermediation.  The causation runs two ways; wealthier 
countries  can  afford  more  sophisticated financial  systems  and  the  depth  of  the 
financial system helps an economy to grow.  Tlis section discusses various aspects 
of this two-way relationship. 
The following five issues are discussed in some detall: 
(i)  the effect of interest rate ceilings on resource allocation. 
(ii)  the role of financial intermediaries in screening loan proposals. 
(iii)  the role of the financial system in providing liquidity insurance. 
(iv)  the implications of differences in private and social returns. 
(v)  the risks of financial liberalisation. 
In each case, the discussion focuses on how the financial system affects resource 
allocation.  Given the lessons from the Romer model, particular attention is given to 
the interaction between  the financial system and the accumulation of knowledge. 
The discussion is heavily biased towards domestic financial markets and away from 
international  financial  markets.  This  is  not  to  say that  access to  world  capital 
markets is not important for resource accumulation and economic growth, for indeed 
it is.  At a very basic level, access to international capital markets permits national 
investment to exceed national savings and thus it allows the achievement of a given 
level  of national  income earlier  than  could  have  been  achieved  through  reliance 
solely on domestic savings.  Integration into world capital markets can also make it 
more  attractive  for  foreign  capital  to  undertake  investment  domestically.  This 
foreign capital often brings access to technology that previously was unavailable to 
the country.  Thus, the extent to which a country has access to both world financial and goods markets has a potentially  large impact on economic growth.  To keep 
what  is  already  a  wide  range  of  issues  from  increasing  further, many  of  these 
important  international  issues  are  pushed  into  the  background  in  the  following 
discussion.  The  focus  is  primarily  on  the  behaviour  of  domestic  financial 
institutions. 
3.1  Interest Rate Ceilings 
The work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) identified interest rate controls as 
one of the  most  important  causes of financial  repression.  Since then, there  has 
developed a voluminous literature on the effects of these controls.  This literature 
has largely focused on the implications for national savings of ceihgs on loan and 
deposit rates.  It  has been argued that these controls reduce the incentive to save. 
As  a result, national savings are lower and, without access to world capital markets, 
actual investment  is  lower.  Whether  or not  lower  interest  rates  actually  lead  to 
reduced  savings  and  capital  formation  has  been  the  topic  of  much  empirical 
research.  Lee (1991) provides a useful summary of this work.  He concludes that 
while the evidence on the existence of a positive relationship between interest rates 
and  savings is  mixed,  there  is  probably  a  quite  weak  but  positive  relationship. 
Perhaps  more  importantly,  he  concludes  that  "there is  overwhelming  evidence 
supporting  the positive  effccts of  real  interest  rates  on  the  volume  of financial 
savings" (page 8).  A similar conclusion is reached by the World Bank in the 1989 
World Development Report. 
It  is  possible  that  repression  of  the  banking  sector  does  not  have  adverse 
implications for resource allocation if other forms of finance can substitute for bank 
loans.  Typically, controls on interest rates lead to the establishment of some type of 
unofficial  or 'kerb-market' that is able to supply intermediated credit to borrowers. 
In many cases, this market acts on the hnge  of the official sector and because of tlle 
risks  involved,  it  has to  incorporate a  large risk  premium  into  its borrowing and 
lending rates.  As a result, access to this market is often limited.  Equity frnance is 
also often not an option.  The information problems involved in the issue of equity 
and the inability of equity investors to obtain widely diversified portfolios mean that 
stock markets are typically underdeveloped in financially repressed economies. 
Given these constraints on  other  forms of finance,  interest  rate controls do have 
important  implications  for  allocation  of  savings.  Provided  that  the  interest  rate ceilings are binding, the financial intermediaries must ration credit.  This need  to 
ration has important consequences for the type of projects that get financed and thus 
on the growth rate of the economy. 
When banks  are required  to ration credit they choose which  projects  receive  the 
limited supply of available finance.  Shaw (1973) argues that the rationing process is 
expensive to administer, is vulnerable to corruption and intensifies the risk aversion 
and  liquidity preference  of  financial intermediaries.  As  a result,  the  banks'  loan 
allocation process is unlikely to be socially optimal.  There will be a bias against 
projects with high expected returns but with relatively high risk.  Whlle the expected 
return of a project is important fiom a social perspective, it is irrelevant to the bank 
provided that the bank is assured of receiving its principal and interest.  Banks will 
thus favour projects with low risk. 
The following example clarifies this point.  Suppose there are two borrowers that 
require one unit of fhding at the maximum interest rate that can be charged (R) by 
the bank.  The interest rate ceiling, however, means that  the bank  can only raise 
sufficient deposits to hnd one of the loans.  Further, assume that the first project 
has an expected rate  of return of  R1, that Rl>R, and that there is no  uncertainty 
concerning  the project's  return.  The second project  is assumed  to have  a higher 
expected rate of return than the first project, however it is risky.  Suppose that its 
expected rate of return is given by R2 > RI and that there is a 50 per cent chance 
that the project will yield R2+a and a 50 per cent chance that it will return R,-a. 
Lastly, assume that neither borrower has any collateral, private returns equal social 
returns and that bank is risk neutral. 
If the bank lends to the first project, its rate of return on the loan will be R. If the 
bank lends to the second project, its expected rate of return depends upon the size 
of a. If a is large enough to make R2-a < R  then there is a 50 per cent chance that 
the borrower will be unable to pay the bank the complete principal and interest.  In 
this case, the bank's expected rate of return on 'this second project is less than  R. 
Because of the interest rate control, the bank is unable to charge the higher return- 
higher risk  borrower  an  interest rate  sufficiently high  to  compensate for the risk. 
The lower risk-lower return borrower thus obtains the rationed credit. 
In  the  above example,  the  problem  could  be  mitigated  by  the  second  borrower 
having collateral to back the loan.  This, however, just pushes the problem one step back.  Banks  extend  the  rationed  credit  to  those  with  the  greatest  amount  of 
collateral and not to those whose projects have the highest expected rates of return. 
Clearly, the way in which the bank allocates the country's savings is sub-optimal in 
the above example.  This has implications not only for the level of national income 
but  also for the  growth  rate of income.  Research  and  development  are typically 
risky activities.  Sometimes they will lead to a break-through, other times they will 
yield  nothing.  These  activities  also  involve  up-front  costs  that  are  only  later 
recouped.  Thus, they must  be  financed.  If the  activities  that lead  to  knowledge 
accumulation are riskier than other types of activities then the need to ration credit is 
likely to result in under-investment in these relatively risky activities. 
In  the  Romer model  presented  above,  the  growth  rate  is  slower than  is  socially 
optimal since inventors do not  take  into account the positive  externality that  their 
research  generates.  When  interest  rate  ceilings  exist  (and  banks  can  effectively 
screen  potential  borrowers)  the  problem  is  compounded  because  the  financial 
intermediaries ignore the social returns of the projects for which they lend.  If banks 
cannot  charge  different  borrowers  different  interest  rates  then  risky,  but  high 
expected return activities will be under-funded by financial intermediaries. 
3.2  Ability to Screen 
In  the above discussion it was assumed that banks knew both the expected return 
and  the  distribution  of  the  returns  for  each  project  and  .that  the  bank  could 
distinguish between borrowers.  It was argued that in this case interest rate ceilings 
were likely  to lead to the financing of safer projects with lower expected returns. 
The assumption of perfect information is a strong one.  In fact, much recent research 
concerning financial markets has focused on the asymmetric  information between 
the borrower and the lender.  Potential borrowers are assumed to know much more 
about their project than anybody else.  This asymmetry in information is at the core 
of one of the most  important reasons  for the existence of  financial intermediaries. 
That  is,  financial  intermediaries  exist  because  of  their  ability  to  cost-effectively 
screen  proposed  investment  projects,  to  assess  the  collateral  of  various  loan 
proposals  and  to  monitor the performance of projects  for which  funds have been lentz.  The efficiency with which the banks perform this screening and monitoring 
function  has  important  implications  for  the  efficiency  with  which  the  country's 
savings are allocated. 
Perhaps the most influential work on the effects of asymmetric information on credit 
markets is the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  They show that if banks are not 
able to  screen  projects  then  increasing  the  rate  of  interest  that  borrowers  are 
required to pay may actually reduce the return to the bank.  This result reflects the 
fact that as the interest rate increases the quality of the pool of customers seeking 
loans from the bank deteriorates.  This occurs through investors with safe projects 
deciding not to borrow (adverse selection) or through each investor choosing a more 
risky project (moral hazard). 
In  the  Stiglitz and Weiss  model,  all  projects  have the  same expected return  but 
projects vary in terms of their riskiness.  The more risky the project, the lower is the 
sensitivity of the borrower's return to the interest rate charged.  If the borrower has 
limited liability then for outcomes in which the project is a failure, the interest rate 
charged  is irrelevant because no  interest is paid.  Since the  loan is only paid  off 
when the project is a success, it is the return in the successfbl state that is important 
for the borrower when considering whether or not to borrow.  Since risky projects 
have  higher probabilities  of failure,  they must  have  better  outcomes in the  good 
states.  As a result, borrowers with risky projects are prepared to pay higher interest 
rates. 
The bank recognises this problem and may be unwilling to increase the loan interest 
rate to clear the market for fear of attracting risky projects.  As the result of setting a 
non-market clearing rate the bank  must ration  credit.  Since it  cannot distinguish 
between projects, the allocation of the rationed funds is random.  This situation is 
commonly referred to as equilibrium credit rationing.  In contrast, Section 3.1 was 
concerned with disequilibrium credit rationing. 
This discussion has assumed that all projects have the same expected value.  While 
this is a usefbl assumption for highlighting the effects of asymmetric information on 
2  Diamond  (1984)  develops  a  theory  of  financial  intermediation  based  on  intermediaries 
minimising the cost of monitoring. bank lending, it is not realistic.  An economy has a range of potential projects that 
can be undertaken.  Some projects have high expected rates of return, others have 
low or negative expected rates of return.  The ability of banks to screen the quality 
of projects  plays  a role  in  determining the return  received  by  the  country  on  its 
savings. 
Consider the following example.  There are two types of projects that exist in equal 
quantities and each requires 100 units of financing.  One project is a "good" project; 
it  has a high expected return and a low variance,  The second project is a "bad" 
project; it has a low expected return and a high variance.  For simplicity, assume 
that the borrowers undertaking both  types  of projects  have no  collateral to  offer. 
There are two possible outcomes for each project.  In the unfavourable outcome the 
good project returns 80 and the bad project returns 67.  In this case neither type of 
borrower is able to repay the full loan.  For the borrower with the good project there 
is a 10 per cent chance that the unfavourable outcome will occur.  For the borrower 
with the bad project this probability is 40 per cent.  In the favourable outcome the 
return to the good project is 123 and the return to the bad project is 130.  Finally, it 
is assumed that private returns equal social returns.  The following table summarises 
the possible outcomes. 
Cost of Projects = 100 
Good Project  Bad Project 
Favourable  Unfavourable  Favourable  Unfavourable 
State  State  State  State 
Probability  0.9  0.1  0.6  0.4 
Return  123  8  0  130  67 
Expected  118.7  104.8 
Return 
Since borrowers only pay interest in the good state, they are prepared to borrow at 
interest rates that exceed the social return on their projects.  Borrowers with good 
projects are prepared to borrow at rates up to 23 per cent while borrowers with bad projects are prepared to pay up to 30 per cent.  The social rates of return on these 
projects are 18.7 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively. 
Suppose that the bank cannot distinguish between the two projects but knows that 
the two projects exist in equal quantities and knows the distribution of returns for 
each project.  Further, initially assume that interest rates are such that both types of 
borrowers apply for loans.  Thus, there is a 50 per cent chance that a project is a 
good type and a 50 per cent chance that it is a bad type.  If  the loan rate is denoted 
by RL  then the expected return to .the bank from a loan is: 
Expected Return to Bank = 0.5 x [ (0.1 X  80) + (0.9 X  100 X (l+RL)) ] + 
If the bank is risk neutral, the loan rate must be set so that the expected return to the 
bank equals the bank's cost of providing the funds R).  This implies that: 
Thus, if the cost of providing loans is 5 per cent then the loan rate will equal 16.8 
per cent.  At this rate, both types of projects apply for and receive finance.  This is 
despite the fact that the social return of the bad project (4.8 per cent) is less than the 
social cost of funds (5 per cent).  Now suppose that the cost of providing a loan 
increases to  10 per  cent.  According  to  the  above formula the  loan  rate  should 
increase  to  23.47  per  cent.  However,  at thls  interest  rate  those  with  the  good 
projects  no  longer  find  it  profitable  to  borrow.  Since  the  bank  knows  the 
distribution of returns, it would know that at the high deposit rate only those with 
poor projects would be applying for loans.  Thus, at a deposit rate of 10 per cent the 
bank would need to charge a loan rate of 38.66 per cent.  At this rate, those with 
bad projects would no longer wish to borrow.  As a result, if the cost of providing a 
loan is 10 per cent there will be no financial intermediation'. 
3  In this example there will be no financial intermediation if the cost of providing funds exceeds 
9.65 per cent.  By slightly altering the pay-offs it is possible to have some range of interest rates 
after which good borrowers drop out of the market, that bad  borrowers are still both prepared 
and able to, obtain finance. This example highlights two important points.  First, it  highlights a critical problem 
for countries with under-developed  financial systems.  If the financial intermediaries 
lack the  skill needed  to assess the  quality  of projects,  it  may  be  difficult  for  an 
intermediation  industry to be profitable  unless  interest  rates are  controlled.  The 
inability of banks to screen, leads to those with good projects subsidising those with 
bad projects.  The higher the cost of providing loans, the greater is this subsidy.  As 
interest  rates  rise  it  becomes unprofitable  for those  with  good  loans  to  pay  the 
subsidy.  Once  the  subsidy  is  not  being  paid,  those  with  bad  projects  may  be 
unwilling to borrow at loan rates that are needed to ensure bank profitability.  All 
financial intermediation may cease. 
The cost of providing a loan may be high for a variety of reasons.  Intermediaries 
may have a shortage of capital and may be seen as relatively risky.  Thus, investors 
will  demand  a  risk  premium  before  they  are  willing  to  deposit  hnds with  the 
intermediary.  This risk premi~un  increases the cost of providing hnds  to borrowers. 
Second, the intermediary may be operated inefficiently.  Poor internal controls and 
procedures and high operating costs may mean that while deposit rates are low, loan 
rates may be quite high.  Third, if there is reasonably  free access to international 
capital  markets  it  is  difficult  to  sustain  risk-adjusted  interest  rates  that  are 
significantly  different from world  interest rates.  High world interest rates are thus 
likely to lead to high domestic deposit interest rates.  If, for any of these reasons, the 
cost of providing a loan is high, a strong financial intermediation industry may find it 
difficult to be profitable unless there are some interest rate controls. 
The second general point made by the above example is that the inability of banks 
to screen causes savings to be allocated poorly.  With a moderate cost of providing 
loans, the financial intermediary provides hds  to both types of projects.  That is, it 
finances  projects  with  both  positive  and  negative  net  social  value.  It  is  even 
possible that projects that have a negative expected gross rate of return get financed. 
In  terms  of  the  growth  model  presented  in  Section  2,  these  distortions  can  be 
thought of as reducing the efficiency with which the economy translates its existing 
resources into new knowledge.  That is, they slow the rate at which the economy 
accumulates the key resources needed for economic growth. 
The  ability  of banks  to  screen  loan  applicants  is  central  to  the  efficacy  of the 
financial system.  An  inability to screen can result  in either the failure of financial 
intermediaries to  develop  or,  if  they  do  develop,  in  an  inefficient  allocation  of savings.  The  ability  to  screen  has  three  essential  components.  First,  the 
intermediary must be able to assess the quality of the project, second it must be able 
to assess the value of collateral offered as security and third it must have the ability 
to monitor the project tluough time. 
For intermediaries to be able to perform these tasks effectively the nation must have 
a strong legal system.  For intermediaries to be able to assess the value of a firm's 
collateral,  the  system  of  property  rights  must  be  clearly  defined  and  widely 
accepted.  If there is uncertainty regarding the current ownership of the particular 
assets  offered  for  collateral  or  if  there  is  uncertainty  about  future  changes  in 
property rights then banks will have difficulty is assessing the security behind their 
loans.  Given  that,  by  its very nature,  collateral  is  only  used  in  the  "bad  case" 
scenarios,  banks  must  value  the  collateral  at  its  value  in  those  bad  cases. 
Uncertainty about property rights therefore prejudices the value of collateral. 
A second aspect of the legal system that is important for financial intermediaries to 
effectively perform their tasks concerns the laws regarding  truthhl reporting  and 
accounting  standards.  If widely  accepted  accounting  standards  do  not  exist,  it 
becomes difficult to asses the current position of the firm and the likely outcome of 
the project.  Banks become  uncertain  as to  whether  a firm's financial statements 
reflect the true position of the firm or just  "creative accounting".  This makes the 
screening task more difficult.  The task is also made more difficult if the country 
does not have strong penalties for deliberate misreporting by  a firm of its current 
financial position and its likely future developments.  If such laws do not exist then 
the  intermediary  needs  to  screen  projects,  not  just  on  the  basis  of  expected 
outcomes but  also on the probability that  the  borrower is  lying.  This makes the 
screening process more costly and in all probability, less effective. 
Given that a widely accepted and enforced system of property rights and accounting 
rules has been established, the structure of the banking system can play an important 
role in minimising the costs arising from asymmetric information.  In particular, the 
adoption of a universal, as opposed to an arms-length, banking system is likely to 
reduce the costs associated with screening problems.  The universal system involves 
the providers of finance having an active role in the internal management of the fm. 
For instance, a representative of the bank may sit on the board of the fm  and the 
bank may  own  shares in  the  firm.  This  allows the  bank  to  actively monitor  the performance of the firm's managers and their investment decisions.  It also serves as 
a signal to other investors that the firm is being soundly managed. 
The German and Japanese banking systems are examples of the universal  system 
while  the  Australian  and  US systems  are  exwples of  the  arms-length  system. 
However, DeLong (1991) argues that prior to World War I the US banking system 
was more like the universal system.  He suggests that this was partly responsible for 
the  rapid  growth  in  the  United  States.  Financial  institutions,  by  having  their 
representatives  on  the  boards  of  firms  were  able  to  make  managers  more 
accountable and ensure that long-term, but high-return investments were undertaken. 
While  the  universal  system  should  help  minimise  distortions  arising  from 
asymmetric  information  and  conflicts  between  the  incentives  of  managers  and 
owners it is not without its costs.  Amongst  these is the potential for intermediaries 
to  use  their  market  power  over  firms  with  which  they  are  associated  to  extract 
monopoly returns.  The system may also be more fragile to large shocks.  If banks 
hold significant share holdings in firms and the share market declines, the capital of 
the  banks  is  reduced.  This  may  make  the  banks  less  willing  to  lend. 
Notwithstanding these problems, the universal system does offer significant gains in 
terms of monitoring, provided that the financial institutions have the capability and 
knowledge to screen projects once the asymmetry in information is removed. 
3.3  Risk Sharing and Liquidity Insurance 
Financial intermediaries are able to improve the allocation of a nation's savings, not 
only  through  their  ability  to  screen  projects,  but  also  through  their  ability  to 
aggregate  idiosyncratic  risk  and  thus  reduce  the  value  of  liquid  balances  that 
individuals wish to hold. 
Investment is a risky  activity.  It  typically  leads to  a stochastic flow  of revenue. 
Whle a particular  investment may have positive net  present  value,  the  stochastic 
nature of the returns means that there may be periods when revenue unexpectedly 
fails to cover costs.  If there is no external source of finance and the investor does 
not hold sufficient liquid balances, the project would have to be liquidated in  such a 
period.  This liquidation  would  have  to  occur  even  though  the  project  still  had 
positive net present value.  As a result of this risk, individual investors are required to hold savings in liquid balances as a form of liquidity insurance.  The size of these 
liquid balances is reduced if financial intermediaries exist. 
The above argument has been formally modelled by Bencivenga and Smith (1991). 
They show that the introduction of a financial  intermediation industry permits the 
economy to  reduce the fraction of its savings that  it holds  in unproductive liquid 
assets.  Banks  borrow  from, and lend to,  a large  number of individuals  and  as a 
result face a fairly predictable  withdrawal  pattern.  Thus,  they  can economise on 
liquid asset holdings and are able to provide temporary finance to projects that have 
a short-term liquidity problem.  An  economy with financial intermediaries is able to 
economise on liquidity insurance and therefore is able to devote more of its savings 
to higher return illiquid assets.  This, in  turn, increases the steady-state growth rate 
of the economy. 
In the Bencivenga and Smith (1 99 1) model, the financial intermediaries either exist 
or they do not exist.  There is no concept of them operating more or less efficiently. 
However,  the  more  effective  are  the  financial  intermediaries  in  insuring  against 
liquidity risk, the greater is the share of savings that can be devoted to illiquid high 
yield assets.  Obviously, the greater  is  the stability and confidence in the b&g 
sector, the lower is the need to hold liquid balances.  Similarly, liquid balances can 
be reduced if the macroeconomy  is sound and there are instruments  available that 
allow financial intermediaries to minimise risks. 
To date,  little  attention  has  been  given  to  the  stock  market.  However,  just  as 
financial intermediaries reduce the need for the holding of liquid balances so does 
the existence of a stock market.  In a recent paper developing the implications of the 
existence of equity markets for economic growth, Levine (1991) argues that a stock 
market will increase the steady-state growth rate by reducing the need to hold liquid 
balances and by facilitating the acc~imulation  of human capital.  He argues that the 
amount  of  human  capital  is  related  to  the  amount  of  physical  capital.  If 
idiosyncratic  liquidity  shocks  cause  an  entrepreneur  to  cease  or  scale  back 
production, some human capital is lost.  The stock market allows the entrepreneur to 
sell hislher stock to cover a liquidity problem  and thus allows the firm to continue 
without  the  loss  of  physical  and  human  capital.  As  a  result,  human  capital 
accumulates more quickly and the steady-state growth rate is faster. A similar idea is developed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989).  They argue that, in 
some cases, the asymmetric information between the owner/managers of a firm  and 
outside  potential  investors  are  so  great  ,that a  stock  market  will  not  develop. 
Individuals  are not able to diversify away the idiosyncratic risk of their particular 
project.  This leads firms to under-invest as a form of insurance.  The smaller scale 
of operations means that human capital accumulation through on-the-job training is 
lower,  as are productivity  gains  achieved  through  learning-by-doing.  Similarly, 
investment  in research  and  development will be lower.  As a result,  the financial 
market distortions that prevent socially optimal risk sharing from talung place lead 
to lower productivity improvements and a slower steady-state growth rate. 
The models  of Bencivenga  and  Smith (1991),  Levine (1991) and  Greenwald and 
Stiglitz  (1989)  take the  economy's financial  structure  as exogenously  given.  In 
contrast,  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990)  derive  the  degree  of  financial 
intermediation endogenously.  They argue that financial intermediation is expensive 
and that low income economies have difficulty in paying the costs involved.  With 
few intermediaries,  project selection is poor and as a consequence growth is slow. 
As  income  gradually  increases,  the  economy  can  afford  more  financial 
intermediation.  As a result,  the quality of project  selection improves  and  growth 
accelerates.  In  maturity, the economy has  a filly developed financial  sector and 
grows faster  than  it  did  when  income  was  lower.  In  this  model  the  degree  of 
financial intermediation both causes growth and is a finction of growth.  mle  the 
paper does not  address the question of appropriate government policy,  it  is likely 
that  policies  aimed  towards  reducing  the  cost  of financial  intermediation  would 
allow the achievement of higher growth rates and possibility higher utility. 
3.4 The Implications of Differences in Private and Social Returns 
In the growth model presented above, the social return to the development of a new 
blue-print exceeds the private return.  As a result, the rate of development of blue- 
prints is slower than is socially optimal.  Thus, economic growth is also slower than 
optimal.  In the model, subsidising the production of blueprints will speed both the 
rate at which they are developed and the rate at which the economy grows. 
A difference between social and private returns characterises many activities in the 
real world.  A popular example is the accumulation of human capital (or education). 
It is often argued  that  individuals are not able to capture for  themselves,  the fill value to  society of  their education.  Since education is  an  activity that  typically 
involves incurring a cost before the benefits are obtained, finance is often required. 
Even  if  financial institutions  worked  perfectly  and  fmanced  all  "projects"  with 
positive  net  present  value,  there  would  be  insufficient  resources  devoted  to 
education as individuals would not have the incentive to obtain the socially optimal 
amount  of  education.  One  policy  response  to  this  problem  has  been  for  the 
government to subsidise education either directly or through the fmancial system.  If 
the fmancial system is used, governments can either subsidise education loans made 
by  commercial banks  or  the  government can  take  over  the role  of  the  fmancial 
intermediary completely and provide direct finance. 
Some governments have used this distinction between private and social returns to 
justify widespread  intervention in  financial markets.  Certain industries or sectors 
are seen as providing dynamic social gains that exceed the private gains.  In some 
cases, this has led to financial markets and financial policy becoming an  important 
tool of industrial policy. 
There is no doubt that there is a strong theoretical argument for intervention when 
social  and  private  returns  diverge.  The  argument  is  particularly  strong  if  the 
distortion not only affects the current level of income but also affects the growth rate 
of income.  In addition, even when the private returns equal the social returns, there 
may be a role for government if the incentives of financial institutions do not permit 
projects  to be fmanced which have high  social returns.  As the above discussion 
suggests, these problems may be particularly severe in developing countries. 
In  practice,  however,  government  intervention  introduces  its  own  incentive 
problems.  The allocation of  credit may  be made, not  on  the basis  of economic 
considerations,  but  rather  on  political  and  social  grounds.  Further,  it  is  often 
difficult for government officials to accurately assess the relative social and private 
returns of various projects.  The assessment process can easily become derailed by 
non-economic considerations.  If the allocation of credit is completely controlled by 
government  then  the  discipline  of  the  market  may  be  lost  and  fmancial 
intermediaries may  have difficulty in  developing the skills needed  for good credit 
assessment.  The development of these skills is an integral part of the development 
process, for it is difficult for the government to continue controlling the allocation of 
fmancial resources as the level of national income increases.  Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, there  does  exist  an  important  role  for  the  government in  the  credit allocation process, particularly in  the early stages of development.  The challenge 
for government is to ensure that this role is not abused4. 
3.5  Costs and Risks of Financial Market Liberalisation 
There is  a  general presumption  that  fmancial  liberalisation,  through  its  ability to 
deepen  a  country's  fmancial  markets,  leads  to  faster  growth.  Nevertheless, 
liberalisation  of  financial  markets  can  have  a  number  of  adverse  effects  on  the 
macroeconomy.  Blundell-Wignall  and Browne (1 99  1) provide a useful summary of 
these effects. 
The costs and risks  associated with  liberalisation  can be broadly  categorised into 
three related areas.  First, the removal of liquidity constraints may make monetary 
policy  more  difficult  to  implement  and  the  resulting  higher  levels  of  debt  may 
complicate the  response of the economy to various  types of shocks.  Second,  in 
liberalised  fmancial  markets,  asset  prices  are  often  volatile  and  may  become 
misaligned,  leading  to misallocation  of resources.  Third,  if  intermediaries  use  a 
poor screening technology then  liberalisation may  allow more poor projects to be 
fmanced.  The implications of poor project selection were discussed in Section 3.2. 
The following discussion centres on the other two potential costs. 
Domestic  fmancial  liberalisation  removes  the  liquidity  constraints  faced  by 
individuals.  As a result, individual  consumption becomes less sensitive to current 
income.  This is also true for countries as a whole as the opening of the economy to 
international markets  breaks the  nexus  between  national  savings  and investment. 
mle  in general, the removal of the liquidity constraints should increase individual 
and national welfare, there are a number of risks and potential problems.  First, the 
operation  of monetary  policy  may  become  more  complex.  No  longer  can  the 
monetary  authorities run monetary policy through  direct controls on interest rates 
and credit.  Instead, monetary policy  is  forced to  operate directly through market 
mechanisms;  that  is  by  changing  financial  prices  to  induce  wealth  effects  and 
intertemporal  substitution.  The  responses  of the  economy  to  these  changes  in 
financial  prices  are often  slow and  variable making the monetary  policy  problem 
Collier  and  Mayer  (1989) discuss various  aspects of the  role  of government  in the financial 
system. more complex than in a highly and effectively regulated system.  On the other hand, 
if the regulations are being circumscribed by other financial institutions then a price 
based  monetary  policy  may  make  monetary  policy  more  effective  than  direct 
controls over a limited range of financial intermediaries. 
A second potential risk relating to the removal of liquidity constraints concerns the 
degree of fragility of the corporate sector to various types of shocks.  When debt 
levels are high, adverse shocks to the economy may create more severe recessions 
and  recessions  with  greater  persistence5.  Higher  debt  levels  imply  lower  firm 
collateral and thus higher agency costs.  These costs are amplified if firms enter a 
recession with highly geared balance sheets.  As a consequence, firms may find it 
difficult to obtain fmance in recessions, even for projects with positive net present 
value.  h  addition, the managers of a highly leveraged firm that suffers an adverse 
shock, may be unwilling to take risky but  profitable investment decisions.  If the 
managers have  significant firm-specific capital they may be unwilling to  entertain 
the increased probability of bankniptcy that the risky investment entails. 
There are also potential problems on the international front from the increase in debt 
made  possible  by  financial  liberalisation.  McKinnon  (1986)  argues  that  many 
developing countries over-borrowed  in the liberalised markets of the  1970s.  This 
over-borrowing  was  made  possible  by  governments  guaranteeing  repayment  of 
international borrowing.  These  guarantees  removed  the  incentives  for lenders to 
properly  screen  projects.  As  a  result,  many  projects  were  undertaken  which 
probably  should  not  have  been  undertaken.  The  resulting  debt-overhang  has 
necessitated tight macro-economic adjustment programs to have been put in place in 
a number of countries. 
The second class of risk arising in liberalised financial markets centres on the risks 
of resource misallocation arising from the behaviour of asset prices.  In liberalised 
markets, many key financial prices are set in auction markets.  Theory suggests that 
these prices are determined by fundamentals and react quickly to news concerning 
changes in these fundamentals.  For example, share market prices should be set on 
the basis of the present discounted value of expected future dividends.  An increase 
in expected future dividends should lead to an increase in share prices.  Because 
5 Bernanke and Gertler (1990) provide a formal model of this effect. asset prices respond to expectations they are often volatile.  In addition, asset prices 
may  become misaligned and  deviate from fundamentals for long periods  of time. 
Blundell-Wignall  and  Browne  (1991)  discuss  the  costs  of  this  volatility  and 
misalignment.  They argue that the uncertainty generated by  volatile asset markets 
may contribute to  a shortening of investment horizons.  This may lead to projects 
being financed  which  generate returns  quickly but  whose  returns are lower  than 
those of more longer-tenn projects.  This could be a particular problem for research 
and  development  projects,  whose  returns  are  often  obtained  only  after  a  long 
gestation  period.  Misalignment  of asset prices,  particularly exchange rates,  also 
generates considerable concern.  If exchange rates move away from fimdamentals 
for long periods of time, the allocation of resources between the traded and  non- 
traded  sectors  becomes  distorted.  For  example,  an  overvalued  exchange  rate 
reduces the competitiveness of a country's traded good sector.  If gaining access to 
foreign markets  is  an  important  part  of  the  process  of  learning-by-doing, or  in 
achieving  economies  of  scale,  this  overvaluation  can  have  extremely  adverse 
consequences  for  growth.  Similar problems  can  occur  in  other  asset  markets, 
particularly the stock market and the housing market. 
4.  THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
Australia's financial system has undergone a significant transformation over the last 
decade.  It has moved from being from  a system dominated by  directed lending, 
quantity controls and interest  rate  ceilings to  a freely  functioning market  system. 
This section explores some of the implications of these changes.  It begins with a 
brief review  of the nature  and rationale of the previously existing regulations and 
summarises the changes that have taken place over recent years. 
4.1  History of Regulation 
The  system  of  -regulation that  governed  the  operation  of  Australian  fmancial 
intermediaries grew out of the need for the government to control the allocation of 
financial resources during World War 11.  In the years following the end of the war, 
this rationale no longer remained, yet the regulation continued.  While this reflected 
a number of factors (see Grenville (1991)), the principal reason was that regulation of  fmancial  intermediaries  was  seen  as  an  effective  method  of  controlling  the 
business cycle6.  It was thought that control of the growth rate of nominal demand 
could  best  be  achieved  through  direct  control  over  the  growth  rate  of  bank 
advances. 
The  regulations  took  a  variety  of  forms.  There  were  both  qualitative  and 
quantitative lending directives.  During certain periods, limits were imposed on the 
overall rate of growth of bank  balance  sheets.  Banks were also directed to  lend 
primarily for trade fmance and not for long term business investment.  There were 
ceilings on bank deposit and loan interest rates and there were lirnits on the maturity 
of interest-bearing deposits that banks could offer their customers.  Control was also 
exercised over bank entry and there were restrictions on the portfolio allocation of 
banks'  balance  sheets.  These  portfolio  restrictions,  together  with  directives 
concerning lending growth, were the principal tools of monetary policy.  Finally, the 
exchange rate was "managed" and there were extensive foreign exchange controls. 
The evolution of these regulations  and  their implications for the  effectiveneqs of 
monetary policy are discussed in considerable detail in  Grenville (1991), Valentine 
(1991) and Harper (1991).  These papers highlight the fact that the controls on the 
banking sector led  to  the  establishment  of non-bank financial institutions.  These 
institutions were subject to  fewer regulations than banks  and  their balance  sheets 
grew much faster than those of the banks.  Graph 1 shows that over the period of 
regulation there was a gradual downward trend in the banks' share of the total assets 
of financial intermediaries.  The growth of non-bank financial intermediaries meant 
that the monetary policy based  on controlling the balance sheets of only the banks 
became increasingly ineffective.  This led to a gradual movement in the first half of 
the 1970s away from direct controls towards a more market based monetary policy. 
Grenvil.le (1991)  also  notes  that  the  motives  for  regulation  included  the  desire  to  sell 
government securities, the maintenance of prudential standards and the need  to allocate credit to 
priority areas.  Harper (1991) argues that the continued regulation reflected the then current state 
of "intellectual opinion ... that  governments should exercise control over the banking system as 
part of their responsibility to manage the macro-economy". Graph 1:  Banks' Assets as a Share of the Assets of all Financial Intermediaries 
The move to a market based system was, however, not without its problems.  With 
an  essentially  fixed  exchange  rate  and  the  economy  becoming  increasingly 
integrated  into  world  capital  markets,  the  scope  for  independent  market  based 
monetary  policy  was  restricted.  As  Grenville  (1991) notes,  attempts to  tighten 
policy  by  selling bonds  were  frustrated  by  the  inflow  of  foreign  capital.  While 
various schemes were implemented to slow the inflow of capital, they only provided 
temporary breathing space.  The problems continued to grow as Australia became 
more integrated into world markets.  These difficulties prompted a partial return to 
direct controls in  the second half of the 1970s.  Perhaps predictably, this policy met 
with  only  limited success and had  a relatively short life.  In  the  first half  of  the 
1980s, the exchange rate was floated, all interest rate controls were removed and 
credit directives ceased. 
The seriousness with which Australian governments have viewed the importance of 
financial markets is reflected in  the three commissioned studies into the operation of 
the financial system over the last one and  a half decades.  In  1979, with  concern 
growing  over  the  effectiveness  of  the  existing  regulations  with  regard  to  both 
resource  allocation  and  monetary  policy,  the  government  commissioned a  wide 
ranging study of  the  financial system.  This  report  (Australian Financial  System 
Inquiry (1981)), became known as the "Campbell Report".  It was followed in  1984 
by a second study (Australian Financial  System Review Group (1984)).  Finally, a 
thlrd  report  (Parliament  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia  (1991)),  commonly referred to as the "Martin Inquiry", was commissioned in 1990.  Unlike the fust two 
reports,  which  were  concerned  with  the  effects  of  regulation,  this  third  report 
assessed the effects of deregulation and the extent of bank competition. 
4.2  Impact of Regulation on Financial Intermediation 
It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  control  on  interest  rates  paid  and  received  by 
Australian banks meant that they had to ration credit.  The discussion in Section 3.1 
suggested that those investors who had the safest projects and those with the most 
collateral would  be first  in  line to  receive  rationed  funds  from  the  banks.  This 
certainly  seems  to  have  been  the  case  in  Australia7.  Nowhere  was  this  more 
obvious  than  in  the  market  for  housing  loans.  Successive  governments  had 
controlled the housing loan rate in an attempt to improve the access of lower income 
groups to housing finance.  However, the interest rate controls meant that the banks 
had to ration the housing credit they extended.  The Carnpbell Committee concluded 
that  this  rationing  meant  that  the  regulations  had  been  "counter-prorlrrctive in 
achieving  their  weyare  objectives,  while  hurting  the  community  at  large  by 
impairing  the  eflciency  of  the financial  system"  (page  647).  That  is,  banks 
preferred to lend to their safest customers; those with a large amount of collateral. 
The interest rate controls had the effect of subsidising housing loans for high income 
earners while excluding low income earners from the market. 
While  the  effect  of  interest  rate  ceilings  on  the  business  sector  received  less 
attention than their effect on the housing sector, the same problems were at work. 
Again,  the  Carnpbell  Cornnittee  concluded  that  "the  interest  rate  ceiling  on 
overdrajls ... has had the eflect of limiting the potential access of small business to 
bank finance.  Once the concessional limit has disappeared ... banks should have 
greater  incentive  to make  loans to small  business" (page 683).  In the regulated 
environment banks  demanded  that  small business loans be covered  by  significant 
collateral and that collateral was generally valued conservatively8.  Rationing9 also 
See Harper (1991). 
A brief discussion of bank lending practices both before and  after regulation is given by  Barton 
(1989) (Chief Credit Controller, AN2  Bank). 
Econometric evidence that banks were required to ration credit before deregulation is presented 
in Blundell-Wignall and Gizycki (1992).  They estimate a disequilibrium model of the supply and meant  that  competition  between  banks  was  subdued.  With  deposit  rates  often 
below equilibrium rates, banks could not compete for funds.  There was also little 
incentive  to  develop  innovative  financial  products.  In  addition,  as  part  of  the 
rationing mechanism, banks typically required that borrowers have a long and stable 
deposit hlstory with the bank before  a loan would be extended.  This limited the 
mobility of bank customers and made competition less attractive. 
As discussed above, the controls on banks led to the growth of non-bank financial 
institutions.  Many  of  these  institutions  were  in  fact  established  by  the  banks 
themselves.  The existence of these non-bank intermediaries partially nullified the 
adverse  resource  allocation  effects  of  the  controls  on  banks.  They  could  not, 
however, completely offset the effects of regulation.  This can be seen in the ratio of 
total assets of financial institutions10 to GDP, which is shown in Graph 2. 
Graph 2: Ratio of Financial Institutions' Assets to GDP 
demand for business credit and  show that, at the then prevailing interest rates, the demand for 
credit  considerably  exceeded  the  available  supply;  that  is,  there  was  disequilibrium  credit 
rationing.  They find little evidence of equilibrium credit rationing in the period since deregulation. 
l0 Financial  assets  include  the  assets  of  banks  (with  the  exception of  the  Reserve  Bank  of 
Australia),  non-bank  financial  corporations,  life  ofices  and  superannuation  funds  and  other 
financial institutions such as cash management trusts and friendly societies. Numerous authors11 have found there is, in general, a positive relationship between 
income per-capita and the ratio of fmancial assets to GDP.  In line with this finding, 
Graph 2 shows that there has been an upward trend in the ratio of the total assets of 
financial institutions to  GDP in  Australia  over  the  last 40 years.  However,  this 
upward  trend  was  interrupted  in  1973,  with  the  ratio  actually  falling  over  the 
following 4 years.  The  1973 level was only reached  again in  1982.  In  part, the 
decline in the ratio after  1973 reflects the high level of the ratio in that year.  The 
early 1970s were characterised by  favourable movements in the terms of trade that 
caused a strong increase in  activity and  increased  demand for fmance.  However, 
the fact that it took ten years for the ratio of fmancial institutions' assets to GDP to 
again  reach  its  1973 level  also  reflects  the  fmancial  repression  induced  by  the 
controls on the banking sector.  The removal of these controls has caused the ratio 
to increase at a much faster rate than previously was the case.  Between  1983 and 
1990 the ratio increased from 1.3 to  1.9.  This suggests that while institutions were 
able to develop under the regulations to partially nullify the effects of the regulations 
on  the  extent  of  financial  intermediation,  these  institutions  did  not  provide  a 
complete substitute. 
Whlle the ceilings on both housing loans and business loans had undesirable effects, 
the business loan restrictions are likely to have been considerably more had1  in 
terms of slowing the rate of economic growth.  Small businesses have little ability to 
access  external fmance  other  than  through  intermediated  credit.  Because  of  the 
costs involved and the information asymmetries, it is difficult for small firms to raise 
hnds  on  equity  marketsl2.  For  many  small  fms the  only  alternative  to 
intermediated  external  finance  is  retained  earnings.  While  the  level  of  desired 
investment is a function of many factors, the rationing of credit to  small business 
must have limited actual investment by small businesses. 
l1  For a comprehensive review see Goldsmith (1985). 
l2 When  a  firm  attempts to issue  equity,  outside  investors  are  not  sure whether  the  firm  is 
attempting  to  raise  hnds for  legitimate  and  profitable  investment  or attempting  to  pass-off 
overvalued  assets.  This  uncertainty  implies  that  equity  must  be  issued  at  a  discount.  The 
information problems  may be so severe that they prohibit  equity raisings.  'These  problems  are 
likely to be greater for small  firms  that  have  no  reputation  to help  overcome the  information 
problems. According to the discussion in Section 3.1, the lifting of interest rate ceilings should 
have had two effects.  First, it should have increased the volume of intermediated 
lending.  Second, it should have changed the structure of lending so that a greater 
proportion of riskier projects gets financed. 
Graph 3 shows the ratio of credit to nominal private final demand between 1967 and 
1992.  The graph shows that  in  1966 this  ratio  stood at 0.4  but  by  1992 it  had 
increased to over 1.1.  The increase in the ratio has, however, not been at a steady 
rate.  Prior to 1984 the ratio had been increasing by slightly less than 0.02 per year. 
The only major exception to this was in the early  1970s when, as the result of a 
mining investment boom, the ratio was significantly above trend.  From  1983 the 
growth  in  the  ratio  of  credit  to  private  final  demand  accelerated,  averaging 
approximately 0.06 per year over the next 8 years.  Much of this increase can be 
attributed to the effects of liberalisation.  It also suggests that while the growth of 
non-bank financial institutions in the  1970s may have been able to supply funds to 
some of the banks' credit rationed customers, the regulations still limited the amount 
of intermediated credit. 
Graph 3: Ratio of Credit to Private Final Demand 
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Given that financial liberalisation allowed a significant increase in the growth rate of 
credit,  what  do  we  know  about  the  allocation  of  that  increased  credit  amongst 
different sectors of the economy?  Graph 4 provides some information on this point. 
It shows the credit extended to various borrower classes as a share of GDP from l977178 to  1991192.  The graph shows prior to  1983184 the rates of growth in the 
ratios of personal lending, housing lending and business  lending to GDP were all 
similar and did not  vary  greatly through time.  In  1984185 this pattern  began to 
change.  The ratio of housing credit to GDP increases at a slightly faster rate than 
previously was the case while  the ratio of  business  credit to  GDP increases at a 
much faster rate.  In l983184 the ratio of business credit to GDP equalled 0.31 but 
by l990191 it had increased to 0.57 per cent.  In contrast, the ratio of personal credit 
to GDP declined &er  deregulation.  This in part reflects classification error.  Due to 
rationing  induced  by  the  regulations,  small  businesses  may  have  substituted 
''personal credit" for "business credit".  In the deregulated environment the need to 
do  this  was  removed.  The  graph  suggests  that  the  regulation  of  financial 
intermediaries placed considerable constraints on the ability of business to borrow. 
Graph 4: Credit by Sector 
(per cent to GDP) 
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The increased willingness and ability of the banks to lend to business can also be 
seen in company balance sheets.  Graph 5 shows the weighted average ratio of debt 
to the book value of assets for a stable sample of  110 large Australian companies 
over the period from 1973 to 199013.  The share of debt in company balance sheets 
l3 For hrther details on  changes  in  the financial  structure of Australian  firms  see Lowe and 
Shuetrim (1992) remained relatively constant at a little over 50 per  cent until the early  1980s.  In 
1980 the ratio stood at 0.52 but by  1989 it had increased to 0.66.  The increase in 
corporate borrowing facilitated much faster growth in company balance sheets in the 
1980s than had occurred in the  1970s.  Over the 7 years to  1990 the average real 
growth rate in the aggregate size of the balance sheets of the  110 companies was 
nine per cent per annum.  This compares with the an average real growth rate of 1.7 
per cent per annum over the l0  years to 1983. 
Graph 5:  Ratio of Debt to Total Assets 
The  second irnplicatioil of  deregulation is  an  increase in  the  proportion  of  risky 
loans made  by  banks.  Provided  that  a  bank  is  able  to  satisfactorily screen its 
customers, it is able to charge an interest rate sufficiently high on risky loans to earn 
a risk-adjusted rate of  return commensurate with  the  rate of return on  less risky 
lending.  nle  data  on  ,the ex-ante  risk  characteristics  of  new  bank  loans  is 
unavailable,  some data on the  ex-post  bad  debts  expenses incurred by  banks  is 
available since 1980.  Graph 6 shows the bad  debt expenses of major banks as a 
percentage of their total assetsl4.  Two points are made by  this  graph.  First, the 
banks' bad  debt expenses as a share of  their total  assets is  counter-cyclical;  the 
recessions in 1983 and  1990 both caused an increase in the bad debts ratio.  This is 
hardly unexpected, as economic contractions cause an increase in business failures 
l4 This graph is from Twrdy (1992). and loan defaults.  The second point  is that, abstracting  from the  business  cycle, 
there has been, over the second half of the  1980s, an increase in  the share of bad 
loans.  In the  six years to  1985, the bad  debts expense as a share of total assets 
averaged less than 0.2 per cent.  Over the five years to  l990 this average was over 
0.4 per  cent.  This suggests  that indeed,  deregulation has  led  to  banks  fmancing 
more risky projects than was previously the case. 
Graph 6: Major Banks' Bad Debts Expenses 
(% of assets) 
Another implication of financial liberalisation is an increase in competitionls.  This 
should be  reflected  in  lower  spreads  between  deposit  and  lending  rates  and  an 
increase in  the range of fmancial products available from intermediaries.  Both of 
these outcomes appear to have occurred in  Australia.  Harper (1991) argues that 
following deregulation "banks developed a veritable  cornucopia of new jhancial 
products  and services"  (page  69).  These included  a  wider  range  of  borrowing 
options and repayment plans, an increased availability of risk-management tools and 
a technology driven increase in  the  range of retail services.  With respect to bank 
l5 Fahrer and Rohling (1992) formally test propositions concerning the degree of competition in 
the market for housing finance in  the deregulated period.  They find that it is possible to reject the 
hypothesis of perfect competition and  perfect  collusion.  They cannot reject  the hypothesis that 
the  industry behaves  as  a Cournot  oligopoly.  They  also construct  a Herfendahl  index  which 
suggests that concentration in the housing loan market declined following deregulation. margins, the Reserve Bank of Australia (1992(a)) argues that the spread between 
the average lending rate and the average deposit rate has narrowed over the 1980s. 
The relaxation of the controls  on entry also served to  increase competition.  The 
number of banking groups operating in Australia increased from 15 in 1983 to 34 in 
1988 while the number of merchant banks increased from 48 to  l l l over the same 
period (see Macfarlane (1 99  1)). 
The theory discussed earlier suggested that lower spreads, an increased variety of 
products, an increased capacity to lend, and the setting of loan rates on the basis of 
risk  should  lead  to  a  substantial  improvement  in  the  allocation  of  resources. 
However, the theory also suggested that the ability of the banks to screen projects 
effectively  is  a  crucial  element  in  capturing  the  gains  from  a  more  developed 
financial  sector.  If  banks  under-invest  in  their  screening  and  monitoring 
technologies  some of the  gains from liberalisation may be  wasted.  Such under- 
investment probably took place in Australia in the  1980s.  This is reflected in the 
Reserve  Bank  of  Australia's  1992 Annual  Report  (1992(b))  that  states  "Recent 
experience underlines the importance of the banks' possessing systems to review 
and grade the quality of all assets on their books,  ....  The banks themselves have 
recognised  the  value  of such systems and are  improving their practices  in  this 
area" (page 28). 
Similar  sentiments  have  been  expressed  by  private  bankersl6.  Financial 
deregulation,  coupled  with  the  entry  of  new  banks,  led  to  competition for  new 
business.  Banks devoted considerable  energy to building their balance sheets and 
increasing their market share.  Often this was on the basis of compromised lending 
standards and inadequate monitoring of existing loansl7. 
l6 See Barton (1989) and Ferdinands (1989). 
17 The relaxation  of credit standards is generally seen as a mistake by the banks.  An  alternative 
view is that the relaxation of credit standards represented  optimal behaviour by  each bank  in  its 
race for market  share.  By relaxing credit  standards, a bank was able to attract new customers. 
The existence of switching costs means that in  future periods,  it  would have some market power 
over these new customers.  Thus, while in  some cases static considerations made certain loans 
unprofitable,  ex-ante  dynamic  considerations  made  the  establishment  of  a  relationship  with  a 
borrower profitable.  The willingness of the banks to undertake these risky loans may have been 
encouraged  by  a  perceived  implicit  deposit  guarantee  from  the  central  bank.  Even  if  this 
interpretation  is  correct,  the  lower  credit  standards  had  a  social  cost  in  that  they  allowed 
investment projects to be undertaken which had low social returns. In Australia,  as in  a number of other countries, the second half of the  1980s was 
characterised by a rapid increase in  real asset prices.  Graph 7 shows the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI),  an index  of  commercial  property  prices,  an index  of housing 
prices and the share price index.  In the second half of the 1980s each of the asset 
price  indices  increased  faster  than  the  CPI.  This  increase  in  real  asset  prices 
reflected  a  number  of  factors  including  financial  liberalisation.  If  financial 
liberalisation does lead to  real productivity improvements  in  the  economy then  it 
should be reflected in higher real asset prices.  Problems, however, arise when both 
financial intermediaries and borrowers  extrapolate  past  asset price  increases  into 
continuing asset price increases.  Lending and borrowing decisions become based 
on expected capital gains which at some point cannot be realised.  The boom and 
bust cycle in the commercial property market is an example of this process.  Poor 
screening by some financial intermediaries led to the funding of projects that were 
based  on unrealistic  continuing increases  in  property  prices.  The result  of  such 
activity is substantial investment in low yielding assets.  When this occurs on a wide 
enough scale, it  harms not  only the borrowers and the banks' shareholders, but  it 
reduces the growth rate in the level of national income. 
Graph 7: CPI and Nominal Asset Price Indices 
(1 984/85=100) 
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It is widely recogmsed that the combination of financial liberalisation, a drive for 
market  share,  real  asset  price  increases  and  poor  screening  and  monitoring  by 
fmancial  intermediaries  wasted  some  of  the  gains  of  financial  liberalisation. Intermediaries have recently tightened credit standards and have developed a greater 
appreciation of the need  to  devote significant resources  to  credit assessment and 
monitoring of loans.  These improvements in the screening technology should leave 
Australia well placed to reap fiuther rewards from the previous liberalisation of its 
financial markets. 
While  the  focus  of  the  above  discussion  has  been  on  resource  allocation,  no 
discussion  of  the  effects  of  financial  liberalisation  is  complete  without  some 
consideration of its implications for monetary policy.  In a deregulated environment, 
monetary  policy  no  longer  operates through direct  quantity controls.  Instead,  it 
works by  inducing wealth  and  intertemporal substitution effects.  There  is  much 
ongoing  research  on  how  monetary  policy  can  best  be  formed  in  such  an 
environmentls.  To address the full range of issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, to conclude this section, I touch briefly on just one issue.  In the spirit of the 
above discussion of the implications of information asymmetries, I examine some of 
the implications for monetary policy of the interaction between agency costs and the 
business cycle. 
The liberalisation of Australian financial markets made possible the large increase in 
business debt discussed above.  This increase in debt is likely to have altered the 
dynamics of the business cycle and the impact of monetary policy on the economy. 
In the  1982-83 recession corporate debt-asset ratios were relatively  low.  As  the 
economy began to recover, the liberalisation of financial markets meant that firms 
were  both  willing  and  able  to  expand  their  balance  sheets through  loans  from 
financial intermediaries. 
As  the economy entered the current recession, debt-asset ratios were at historical 
highs  and  interest  cover  ratios  were  at  historical  lows.  The  interaction  of  the 
recession  and the  highly-leveraged  balance  sheets meant  that firm net worth was 
relatively  low  and  bankruptcy  risk  was  relatively  high.  In  Section  3.5  it  was 
suggested that  the  outcome of  such a situation would  be  a reduced  incentive for 
management to undertake risky investment and a higher cost of finds to those fms 
wishing to borrow.  An  implication of this is that a setting of monetary policy that 
previously could have engineered a recovery in activity may now be unable to do SO. 
See Macfarlane (1991) and the papers in Blundell-Wignall(1992). A period of balance sheet "reconstruction" may be required before a strongly based 
recovery is possible. 
The increased riskiness of loans to business in an economic downturn is reflected in 
a widening of the  spread between  loan rates and  the banks' cost of funds.  This 
introduces a difficult problem for monetary policy particularly during recessions that 
are  the  result  of previously  tight  monetary  policy.  As  nominal  money  market 
interest rates are eased through monetary policy, banks' loan rates may not fall to the 
same extent, due to the increased risk premium associated with the recession.  To 
reduce bank loan rates to a particular level requires an easier monetary policy that 
would be the case if there were no risk premium.  As the economy recovers, the risk 
premium narrows and with no change in  monetary policy loan rates fall.  This adds 
further stimulus to the recovery. 
The  basic  problem  is  that  the  risk  premium  is  counter-cyclicallg.  When  the 
economy is in recession the risk premium is high and when the economy is growing 
strongly the premium is low.  Thus, even if monetary policy is unchanged the loan 
rate  will  vary  and  it  will  vary  in  a  way  that  will  amplify  the  cycle.  This 
amplification is likely to be  greater the  more highly  geared are corporate balance 
sheets and the  lower  is the  capital base  of the  banks.  The  counter-cyclical  risk 
premium is also  likely to  increase  the persistence  of shocks to  the  economy.  A 
positive  shock  that  improves  corporate  and  bank  balance  sheets reduces  agency 
costs  and  this  sustains  the  boom  through  lower  loan  rates.  This  increased 
persistence  and  amplification  of  the  business  cycle  caused  by  counter-cyclical 
agency costs complicates the setting of monetary policy, 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In  order to  sustain steady-state growth, an  economy must  be  able to  continually 
improve its technology, to  increase  its  stock  of human  capital  and to  accumulate 
production know-how.  To use the terminology employed in this paper, the economy 
must be able to continually accumulate knowledge.  Much of the new endogenous 
growth  literature  highlights  the  fact  that  this  accumulation  does  not  occur  by 
19 Blundell-Wignall and Gizycki (1992) discuss the evidence on this issue for Australia. accident.  It is the result  of incentives that  face  individuals.  This literature  also 
highlights  the  fact  that,  in  general, these  incentives will  not  lead  to  the  optimal 
accumulation of knowledge. 
Knowledge accumulation does not take place independently of the financial system. 
The  activities  that  lead  to  tlis accumulation are  risky  and  often require  external 
finance.  The  availability  of  this  finance,  and  the  conditions  under  which  it  is 
extended,  depend  upon  the  incentives  of  the  borrower  and  of  the  financial 
intermediary.  These incentives are a function of a variety of factors including the 
extent  of  regulation  of  intermediaries,  the  legal  system,  the  capital  structure  of 
intermediaries,  the riskiness of projects and the ability of intermediaries to  screen 
and monitor loans.  Just as private incentives do not necessarily lead to the optimal 
accumulation of knowledge, the incentives that operate in financial markets do not 
necessarily lead to the optimal allocation of a country's savings. 
The  task  of  policy-makers  is  to  design  an  institutional framework  in  which  the 
financial system ensures that savings are allocated to projects that maximise social 
welfare.  Such a framework must  be  based  on a stable legal system and widely 
accepted accounting and disclosure rules.  Financial intermediaries must  also have 
the  independence  and  skills  to  evaluate  projects.  In  the  early  stages  of  the 
development  of  a  financial  system  these  skills  may  be  under-developed  and 
intermediaries  may  have  insufficient  capital.  Thls  can  lead  to  poor  project 
selection.  If this is the case, there is a potential role for government in determining 
the allocation of savings.  However, such a role is only valid if the government has a 
better screening technology than the developing financial intermediaries and if the 
incentives  which  face  government  are  not  distorted  by  political  or  other 
considerations. 
The Australian experience demonstrates that as the financial system develops, and 
the economy becomes  increasingly integrated in the world economy, the ability to 
effectively  regulate  the  system  through  non-price  mechanisms  declines.  It  also 
suggests  that  regulation  distorts  the  allocation  of  resources  as  financial 
intermediaries  are forced to  ration credit.  When credit  is rationed intermediaries 
have  an  incentive  to  lend  only  for  safe  projects.  If  the  activities  that  lead  to 
accumulation  of knowledge  are  relatively  risky,  the  misallocation  of  savings  by 
financial  intermediaries  not  only has  static efficiency costs but  it  also  slows the 
growth rate of the economy. Finally,  experience  also  suggests  that  financial  liberalisation  is  not  without  its 
dangers.  If the banking system ineffectively screens projects, a poor allocation of 
funds will result.  In addition, individuals and  fms  private  incentives to  acquire 
debt may lead to debt levels that are greater than are socially optimal.  As  a result, 
the economy becomes more sensitive to shocks and this increases the difficulty of 
operating monetary  policy.  Notwithstanding  these  dangers,  the  liberalisation  of 
Australian financial markets has improved resource allocation and made possible a 
faster rate  of economic growth than would  have been  possible  had  the regulated 
system continued. REFERENCES 
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